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Spatial models of product diﬀerentiation in the spirit of Hotelling (1929)
and Salop (1979) have been a popular tool in Industrial Organization.
They have been used to study competition in all sorts of markets and all
sorts of issues.1
Typically, the Hotelling model has been used to study location decisions
by ﬁrms while the Salop model has been used to study entry decisions
and market structure. Concerning the Salop model, one prominent result
is the so-called excess entry theorem. It states that in a free-entry equilib-
rium, there are always more ﬁrms entering into the market than would
be desirable from a welfare point of view. That is, there is excessive entry
into the market. As ﬁrms are usually assumed to be single product ﬁrms,
the result can also be interpreted as an excess of product variety provided
in the market.2
However, one underlying, and quite restrictive assumption in the Salop
model, is that consumer demand does not depend on the price of a prod-
uct. Each consumer demands a single unit of a diﬀerentiated product.
In consequence, the price then constitutes a mere transfer between con-
sumers and ﬁrms and thus has no impact on total welfare. It is the aim
of the present paper to lift this assumption of completely inelastic de-
mand. We want to investigate the consequences of this modiﬁcation on
the validity of the excess entry theorem. In contrast to a version of the
model with completely inelastic demand, prices do have a welfare impact.
Higher prices of the diﬀerentiated product now lead to lower demanded
quantities of the diﬀerentiated product.
In a previous paper, Gu and Wenzel (2009), we show that this assump-
tion of completely inelastic demand can be critical. We introduce price-
dependent demand in the Salop model by assuming a speciﬁc functional
form. Consumer demand takes the form of a demand function with con-
stant elasticity. In this framework, we get excess, insuﬃcient or optimal
1E.g., Anderson and Coate (2005) on media markets, Friedman and Thisse (1993) on
collusion, Armstrong (2006) for a study on two-sided markets, and many more.
2With respect to variants of the standard Salop model, Matsumura and Okamura (2006)
ﬁnd this excess entry result holds for a broad class of transport and production cost
functions.
4entry. The outcome depends on the exogenous and constant demand
elasticity. If the demand elasticity is suﬃciently small, we get excess entry
while with large demand elasticities we get insuﬃcient entry. The driving
force of the results is the impact of the consumer reactions to product
price on the level of competition.
The present paper explores the relationship between price-dependent de-
mand and the excess entry theorem in a more general setting. We study a
setup in which consumer preferences can be represented by a quasi-linear
utility function. We make a mild restriction on the resulting consumer de-
mand function for the diﬀerentiated product, namely we assume that the
price elasticity is increasing in the price. This assumption is satisﬁed by
many demand functions, for instance, linear demand functions. It is also
a common assumption in the business literature.3 In this setup, we es-
tablish existence and uniqueness of symmetric price equilibrium in Salop
models for general price dependent demand functions.
Our main objective is to characterize welfare properties of the free-entry
equilibrium. We show that unlike the standard Salop model with com-
pletely inelastic demand, the free-entry equilibrium may exhibit excessive,
insuﬃcient or optimal entry. The intuition behind this result lies in the
degree of competition. If demand is relatively inelastic, competition is
weak and hence too much ﬁrms enter. However, when demand is price-
dependent ﬁrms must be more careful when setting the price as an in-
crease in price reduces the quantity demanded. The stronger this eﬀect,
that is, the larger the demand elasticity is, the lower are prices and proﬁts.
And hence, the incentives to enter are reduced. Thus, following this intu-
ition, we show that if the demand elasticity in equilibrium is low we get
excess entry, and if it is high, we get insuﬃcient entry. However, in our
setup equilibrium demand elasticity is endogenous. Thus, we are inter-
ested in exogenous parameters that lead to a high / low demand elasticity.
We ﬁnd that high ﬁxed costs of entry and low transportation costs lead
to a high demand elasticity and hence insuﬃcient entry. Conversely, low
ﬁxed costs of entry and high transportation costs lead to a low demand
elasticity and hence, excessive entry.
Our result also closes, at least partially, the gap between diﬀerent ap-
3See, e.g., Lariviere and Porteus (2001) and Ziya et al. (2003).
5proaches of modeling competition in diﬀerentiated product markets. In
representative consumer models, such as Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), or in
discrete choice models of product diﬀerentiation, for instance see the
overview in Anderson et al. (1992), equilibrium entry can be excessive,
insuﬃcient, or optimal depending on the exact model conﬁguration.
Further approaches to introduce price-dependent demand into spatial
models are Boeckem (1994), Rath and Zhao (2001), Peitz (2002) and An-
derson and de Palma (2000). The ﬁrst two papers consider variants of
the Hotelling framework. Boeckem (1994) introduces heterogenous con-
sumers with respect to reservation prices. Depending on the price charged
by ﬁrms some consumers choose not to buy a product. The paper by Rath
and Zhao (2001) introduces elastic demand in the Hotelling framework by
assuming that the quantity demanded by each consumer depends on the
price charged. The authors propose a utility function that is quadratic
in the quantity of the diﬀerentiated product leading to a linear demand
function. In contrast to those two models we build on the Salop model
as we are interested in the relationship between price-dependent demand
and entry into the market. Our approach is closer to Rath and Zhao (2001)
as we also assume that each consumer has a downward sloping demand
for the diﬀerentiated good although we do not postulate a speciﬁc func-
tional form. Peitz (2002) features unit-elastic demand both in Hotelling
and Salop settings but focuses on conditions for existence of Nash equi-
librium in prices. He does not consider entry decisions. Anderson and
de Palma (2000) propose a model that integrates features of spatial mod-
els where competition is localized and representative consumer models
where competition is global. In this model, consumer demand is elastic
with a constant demand elasticity. The study focuses on the interaction
between local and global competition.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines
our model. Section 3 establishes the existence and uniqueness of the
symmetric price equilibrium and analyzes its properties both for a given
number of ﬁrms and under free entry condition. In Section 4 we compare
market equilibrium with optimal outcomes. Section 5 concludes.
62 The model
Here we set up our model. Our aim is to stay close to the original Salop
model as, for instance, outlined in Tirole (1988). The only modiﬁcation
we make is to introduce price-dependent demand.
2.1 Model setup
There is a unit mass of consumers who are uniformly located on a cir-
cle with circumference one. The location of a consumer is denoted by x.
Consumers derive utility from the consumption of a diﬀerentiated prod-
uct and of a homogenous product, which serves as a numeraire good. The
homogenous good is produced in a competitive industry while the diﬀer-
entiated product is produced within an oligopolistic industry. Behavior
in the oligopolistic industry is the focus of our analysis.
We assume that consumers’ utility is quasi-linear. Then, a consumer,
located at x, gains the following utility from consuming a diﬀerentiated





V + v(qD) − t|x − xi| + qH if the diﬀerentiated product is consumed
qH otherwise,
(1)
where qD and qH are the quantity of the diﬀerentiated and homogenous
good, respectively. The utility derived by the consumption of the diﬀer-
entiated good consists of three parts. There is a gross utility for consum-
ing this good V . The second utility component depends on the quantity
consumed v(qD); v(qD) is assumed to be continuous and three times dif-
ferentiable with v
 
> 0 and v
  
< 0. Finally, consumers have to incur
costs of mismatch (transportation cost) if the product’s attributes do not
match consumers’ preferences; these costs are linear in distance and do
not depend on the quantity consumed.4 We assume the gross utility V is
4Transport costs are one time costs independent of the quantity. As an interpretation
these could be costs for driving to a shopping mall. Alternatively, one could also assume
transport costs to depend on the quantity. These would be a plausible assumption if the
horizontal dimension is interpreted as a taste dimension.
7large enough so that no consumer abstains from buying the diﬀerentiated
product. Note also that there is decreasing marginal utility in the quantity
of the diﬀerentiated product.
Each consumer is endowed with wealth Y which she can spend on the
two commodities, the diﬀerentiated product and the numeraire good. We
restrict consumers to consume only one variant of the diﬀerentiated prod-
uct. Let us denote the price of the diﬀerentiated product by p and nor-
malize the price of the numeraire good to 1. Then each consumer faces
the following budget constraint:
Y = p ∗ qD + qH. (2)
The diﬀerentiated product is oﬀered by an oligopolistic industry with
n ≥ 2 ﬁrms each oﬀering a single variant. We are not interested in location
patterns. Hence, we assume that these ﬁrms are located equidistantly on
the unit circle.5 The distance between two neighboring ﬁrms then is 1
n.
To model competition in this market, we study the following three stage
game. In the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms may enter the market. In the second stage,
ﬁrms compete in prices. In the third stage, consumers choose a supplier
of the diﬀerentiated product and the quantity.
2.2 Demand for the diﬀerentiated product
We start by deriving individual demand for the diﬀerentiated product.
Suppose a consumer has decided to choose a certain supplier i. Then,




u(qD,q H)=V + v(qD)+qH
s.t. p ∗ qD + qH = Y
qD,q H ≥ 0.
5See Economides (1989) for the existence of symmetric location equilibria in the model
with unit demand.
8A consumer’s demand for the diﬀerentiated good is determined by max-
imizing utility (equation (1)) under the budget constraint (equation (2)).
We further assume that Y is suﬃciently large such that the demand for the
homogenous good is always positive. Then, by solving v
 
(qD)=p we get
a downward sloping individual demand function for the diﬀerentiated
product q(p). Since v(qD) is continuous and three times diﬀerentiable,
q(p) is continuous and twice diﬀerentiable in (0,Q) where Q<+∞ is the
up-bound of demand obtained when p =0 .
Our assumption of quasi-linearity becomes convenient when expressing
indirect utility. The surplus associated with the demand function q(p)
when a consumer located at x buys the diﬀerentiated from a ﬁrm located
at xi at a price pi < ˆ p is
ˆ U = V + Y +
  ˆ p
pi
q (p)dp − t|x − xi|, (3)
where ˆ p denotes the minimum price where the function q(p) becomes
zero.
2.3 Marginal consumer and demand
Given the symmetric structure of the model, we seek for a symmetric
equilibrium. Therefore we derive demand of a representative ﬁrm i which
for convenience is designated to be located at zero. Suppose that this ﬁrm
charges a price of pi while all remaining ﬁrms charge a price of po. Then
the marginal consumer is the consumer indiﬀerent between choosing to
buy from ﬁrm i and the neighboring ﬁrm located at 1
n. Using equation
(3) the marginal consumer (¯ x) is implicitly given by
V + Y +
  ˆ p
pi
q (p)dp − t¯ x = V + Y +
  ˆ p
po

















9As each ﬁrm faces two adjacent ﬁrms, the number of consumers choos-
ing to buy from ﬁrm i is 2¯ x. According to the demand function, each
consumer buys an amount of q (pi). Hence total demand at ﬁrm i is:
Di =2 ¯ x ∗ q (pi). (5)
In contrast to the standard model with completely inelastic demand, to-
tal demand consists now of two parts: market share and quantity per
consumer. When choosing prices ﬁrms have to take into account of both
eﬀects. An increase in price reduces market share as well as the quantity
that can be sold to each customer. This second eﬀect is not present in the
standard model.
3 Analysis
This section analyzes the equilibrium. In a ﬁrst step we characterize the
price equilibrium for a given number of ﬁrms and provide conditions for
the existence. In a second step, we seek to determine the number of ﬁrms
that enter.
3.1 Price equilibrium
We look for a symmetric equilibrium in which all ﬁrms charge the same
price. Assuming zero production costs, the proﬁt of a representative ﬁrm
i when this ﬁrm charges a price pi and all remaining ﬁrms charge a price
po is given by:

































































For the moment let us suppose that a symmetric price equilibrium exists.
Later we will turn to this issue and provide existence conditions. Applying

















Note that the last part of equation (9) includes the price elasticity of in-
dividual demand evaluated at equilibrium price. After the following def-
inition, we express this equilibrium condition in terms of price elasticity
of demand.











[1 − ε∗]. (10)
We use this condition to state corresponding equilibrium proﬁts. Inserting

















n2 [1 − ε∗]. (11)
It can be seen immediately that there is a negative relationship between
equilibrium demand elasticity and equilibrium proﬁt.
113.2 Equilibrium existence
Now we provide conditions that ensure existence of a symmetric price
equilibrium as stated in equation (10). We start with a preliminary result:
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, demand is inelastic, that is, ε∗ < 1.
Proof: see appendix.
This result reveals that analogous to a monopolist who sets the price to
reach unit elasticity, a ﬁrm in the current model will only set price at the
inelastic segment of the demand function.
To ensure existence, we have to impose some additional structure on the
demand function. We introduce the following assumption:6
Assumption 1. The absolute value of price elasticity of demand ε is strictly
increasing in p ∈ (0, ˆ p) and limp→ˆ p ε(ˆ p) = limp→ˆ p ε|p=ˆ p ≥ 1.
When ε is strictly increasing in p, it is shown in the literature that the
individual consumer revenue function R(p)=pq(p) is strictly unimodal
over the entire interval of strictly positive demand. For a discussion on
this point see Ziya et al. (2004). Strict unimodality of R(p) means that pq(p)
has a unique global maximum   p in (0, ˆ p) and if p1 and p2 are two points
in (0, ˆ p) such that p1 <p 2 <   p or   p<p 1 <p 2 then R(p1) <R (p2) <R (  p)
or R(p2) <R (p1) <R (  p), respectively.7 Apparently a proﬁt maximizing
monopolist will set p =   p when no production cost is involved and it’s
well known that ε(  p)=1 . When price p goes down from   p, both price
elasticity of the demand ε and product revenue R(p) strictly decrease.
As an example, one functional form that satisﬁes assumption 1 is a linear
demand function of the type q = a − bp or a quadratic function of the
form q = a − bp2, where both a and b are suitable positive constants.8
6This assumption is suﬃcient but not necessary for the existence of a symmetric price
equilibrium.
7This representation follows Bertsekas (1999) and it is also adopted by Ziya et al. (2004).
8In both examples, the maximum value of the elasticity is obviously larger than 1.
12Under Assumption 1, we are now ready to establish the existence of a
unique symmetric price equilibrium given by equation (10).
Proposition 1. For any given number of ﬁrms n ≥ 2, there exists a
unique symmetric price equilibrium identiﬁed by condition (10), namely,
q (p∗)p∗ = t
n [1 − ε∗].
Proof: see appendix.
It is relatively straightforward to verify the existence of the symmetric
price equilibrium when ﬁrms have no incentive to undercut their neigh-
bors and to establish its uniqueness. By constructing an auxiliary demand
function, we then show no undercutting is possible. The detailed proof is
relegated to the Appendix.
3.3 Properties of price equilibrium
We can now study the properties of the price equilibrium. Lemma 2 below
states the comparative statics eﬀect of the number of ﬁrms active in the
market and of transportation costs on equilibrium price, equilibrium price
elasticity and ﬁrm proﬁt.
Lemma 2. Comparative statics.
i) Equilibrium price, price elasticity of demand and ﬁrm proﬁt de-
crease in the number of entrants, that is,
dp∗
dn < 0, dε∗
dn < 0 and
dΠ∗
dn < 0.
ii) Equilibrium price, price elasticity of demand and ﬁrm proﬁt increase
in transportation costs, that is,
dp∗
dt > 0, dε∗
dt > 0 and dΠ∗
dt > 0.
Proof: see appendix.
Unsurprisingly, the larger the number of ﬁrms the lower the price. Proﬁts
also decrease with the number of ﬁrms in the market. Additionally, the
demand elasticity decreases with the number of ﬁrms in the market. This
13follows from our assumption that the demand elasticity increases in the
price. The impact of transportation costs on prices and proﬁts is the
same as in standard location models. Prices and Proﬁts increase with
transportation costs.
3.4 Entry
Until now the analysis has treated the number of ﬁrms which oﬀer diﬀer-
entiated products as exogenously given. We now investigate the number
of active ﬁrms when it is endogenously determined by a zero proﬁt con-
dition. We assume that to enter, a ﬁrm has to incur an entry cost or ﬁxed
cost of f. Additionally, we treat the number of entrants as a continu-
ous variable. Setting equation (11) equal to f determines implicitly the




In general, it is not possible to express the number of entrants explic-
itly as the equilibrium demand elasticity (ε∗
nc) depends on the number of
competitors. In this paper, we have assumed that the market is viable
for at least two ﬁrm. So the ﬁxed costs must not be prohibitively high:
f ≤ F = t
4 (1 − ε∗
n=2). Thus, we only consider ﬁxed costs in f ∈ (0,F).9
We know from Lemma 2 that proﬁts decrease monotonically in the num-
ber of ﬁrms. Hence, we know that a solution to equation (12) exists and
is unique.
The comparative static results concerning transportation costs and ﬁxed
costs are as expected. Higher transportation costs lead to more entry while
higher ﬁxed costs to less entry, that is, dnc
dt > 0 and dnc
df < 0. This follows
immediately from Lemma 2.
Later, it will turn out that equilibrium demand elasticity is a crucial factor
for our welfare results. Thus, we are interested in its properties. With
endogenous entry, equilibrium demand elasticity is essentially a function
of the exogenous variables, ﬁxed costs and transportation costs. When




14ﬁxed costs are low, a large number of ﬁrms enter which decreases equi-
librium demand elasticity (as shown in Lemma 2). Converse is the impact
of transportation costs. High transportation costs lead to a large number
of entrants, and hence, to a low demand elasticity. Formally,
Lemma 3. Equilibrium price elasticity increases in ﬁxed costs and de-
creases in transportation costs, that is,
dε∗
nc










df > 0,a sdε∗
dn < 0 by lemma 2 and dnc






dt < 0,a sdε∗
dn < 0 by lemma 2 and dnc
dt > 0 from above.
Hence, because of these strictly monotone relationships, there is a one-to-
one relationship between equilibrium demand elasticity and ﬁxed costs or
transportation costs, respectively. For instance, for each value of ﬁxed cost
f ∈ (0,F) we can identify the corresponding equilibrium price elasticity
ε∗(f) ∈ (0,ε ∗
n=2), and vice versa. The same applies to transportation costs.
We will make use of these relationships when expressing welfare results.
4 Welfare
This section considers the welfare implications. We ask whether there is
excess entry into the market as it is the case in models with completely
inelastic demand.
In contrast to models with completely inelastic demand, we have to con-
sider prices in our welfare analysis as they have an impact on the quantity
purchased and hence on welfare. We deﬁne social welfare as the sum of
consumer utility and industry proﬁts:
W = V + Y +
  ˆ p
p












      
Industry proﬁts
. (13)
We consider a ﬁrst-best benchmark, in which the social planner can control
prices and the level of entry, that is, she maximizes total welfare with
respect to p and n. From equation (13), we see that the optimal price is
15equal to marginal cost, in this case, p =0 . Inserting this into equation (13)
yields
W = V + Y +
  ˆ p
0




tx dx − fn. (14)
The problem for the social planner is then identical to the case with com-
pletely inelastic demand, hence reduced to a trade-oﬀ between transporta-






To shape intuition, it is useful to start with a preliminary result:
Lemma 4. There is excess entry if  ∗
nc < 3
4, insuﬃcient entry if  ∗
nc > 3
4,
and optimal entry if  ∗
nc = 3
4.
Lemma 4 can easily be derived by comparing equations (12) and (15). This
lemma provides conditions for the existence of excessive, insuﬃcient, and
optimal entry. If equilibrium demand elasticity is suﬃciently low we get
excess entry as in the standard model with completely inelastic demand.
If, on the other hand, equilibrium demand elasticity exceeds 3
4, there is
insuﬃcient entry into the market. The intuition behind the result can be
seen in equation (11). The higher equilibrium demand elasticity is, the
lower the proﬁts are; and hence the smaller the incentives to enter the
market will be.
However, equilibrium demand elasticity is endogenous in this model.
Thus, our aim is to state the welfare result in terms of exogenous variables.
Now we can make use of the monotone relationship between equilibrium
demand elasticity and ﬁxed costs of entry. Entry is excessive (insuﬃcient)




4). This leads to:
Proposition 2. Welfare result.
i) Suppose ε∗
n=2 ≥ 3
4 and deﬁne f as the ﬁxed cost level that leads to
16equilibrium price elasticity ε∗
nc = 3
4. Then there is excess entry if
f<f, insuﬃcient entry if f>f and optimal entry if f = f.
ii) Suppose ε∗
n=2 < 3
4, then there is excess entry for all f ∈ (0,F].
Proof: see appendix.
Proposition 2 contains the main contribution of the paper. When account-
ing for price-dependent demand the excess entry result of the standard
model with completely inelastic demand needs not hold. In the proposi-
tion we have to consider two cases. First, if the demand function is such
that ε∗
n=2 ≥ 3
4. Then, if ﬁxed costs of entry are high such that the corre-
sponding equilibrium demand elasticity is high, entry into the market is
insuﬃcient. Conversely, if ﬁxed costs are low, the number of ﬁrms that
enter is high which leads to a low demand elasticity. And hence, entry
into the market is excessive. The second case we have to consider is a




creases in n, ε∗
nc < 3
4 for all values of ﬁxed costs (f ∈ (0,F)). And thus,
there is always excess entry in this case.
Alternatively, it is also possible to restate the welfare result in terms of
transportation costs. This is formally done in the appendix. There, we
show that insuﬃcient entry is possible if transportation costs are suﬃ-
ciently low.
5 Conclusion
This paper has introduced price-dependent demand into the Salop model.
Our analysis focuses on the welfare implications of this generalization of
the original model outlined by Salop. While in the model with com-
pletely inelastic demand the excess entry result holds, this is no longer
true when accounting for price-dependent demand. Results are not that
clear-cut anymore. Entry or product variety, respectively, can be excessive,
insuﬃcient, or optimal.
As the Salop model is widely used in all sorts of applications, we believe
that our results are of some importance. In the light of the present pa-
17per, accounting for price-dependent demand may lead to diﬀerent welfare
conclusions.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1





































      
non-positive
(16)
obtains a strictly negative value. The middle part in the right-hand side
of (16) is positive because we are interested in symmetric equilibrium
(pi = po). With dΠi
dpi being negative, whenever demand elasticity exceeds
or is equal to 1, a ﬁrm wants to reduce price in order to boost demand.



















=⇒ ε∗ < 1.
This concludes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: The structure of the proof is the following. We ﬁrst show that the
necessary ﬁrst order condition (10) admits a unique solution. Second, we
prove that under the condition of symmetric price and without undercut-
ting, ﬁrm proﬁt is quasi-concave in the strategy variable pi. Last we show
that ﬁrms have no incentive to undercut neighbors when they are in the
situation identiﬁed by the ﬁrst order condition.
181) Deﬁne ∆(p)=q (p)p − t
n [1 − ε(p)]. Because v(qD) is continuous and
three times diﬀerentiable, q(p) and ε(p) are continuous and diﬀeren-















and for the individual consumer (R(p)=pq(p)) revenue-maximizing   p,
∆(  p)=q (  p)   p>0.
Because of continuity, ∆(p)=0obtains solution(s) for p ∈ (0,   p). Take














dp > 0; since R(p) is strictly unimodal, for
p ∈ (0,   p),
dR(p)
dp > 0 as well. Hence, we conclude
d∆(p)
dp > 0. Because of
this monotonicity, ∆(p)=0obtains a unique solution in (0,   p). When
p ∈ [  p, ˆ p), we know ε(p) ≥ 1 which means ∆(p) > 0 for [  p, ˆ p).S o
the solution given by q (p)p = t
n [1 − ε(p)] for p ∈ (0,   p) is the unique
solution.

















































We know when the ﬁrst order condition under symmetric price holds,
19q (p∗)p = t































































































the ﬁrst order condition holds (1 − ε(p∗)) > 0, the right hand side of
equation (17) is strictly negative for ∀pi ∈ (0,   p). In consequence, any
ﬁrm’s proﬁt function is necessarily strictly concave whenever condition
(10) holds. Hence for all of the ﬁrms, ﬁrm payoﬀ is strictly quasiconcave
in strategy variable pi.
3) In this step we verify if any ﬁrm would have incentive to undercut its
neighbors. For a ﬁrm to undercut its closest neighbors, the price it
sets has to be low enough to attract consumers with a distance further
than 1
n. Using consumer’s indirect utility function, for 0 <p i <p ∗ the
following condition has to hold.





+ Y + V ≥
  ˆ p
p∗








To investigate condition (18), we ﬁrst prepare an additional result (i.e.,
inequality (21) below) for further use. By solving (10) we will have
equilibrium price p∗, the corresponding demand q∗ = q(p∗) and price





20We construct an auxiliary demand function with constant elasticity ε∗,
q†(p)=ϕp−ε∗
which also passes through the point (p∗,q∗). With this demand func-












Applying the necessary condition for symmetric equilibrium 1 − ε∗ =
n





































, ∀ pi ∈ (0,p ∗). (20)
Note also that q†(p)=ϕp−ε∗
has a constant elasticity ε∗ while q(p)
obtains elasticity ε∗ at the point (p∗,q∗) but strictly lower elasticity
ε<ε ∗ when price decreases. That is, for the same percentage decrease
of price, although q(p) and q†(p) start out at the same point (p∗,q∗),
q(p) increase less than q†(p) does. Hence,
q(p) <ϕ p −ε∗








dp,f o r ∀ pi ∈ (0,p ∗).






for ∀ pi ∈ (0,p ∗). (21)
21Now we are ready to discuss the undercutting strategy for ﬁrm i facing
consumer demand function q(p). To undercut its neighbors who are
charging the symmetric equilibrium price p∗, condition (18) has to hold.
Because of the result we established in (21), there exists no positive
price that satisﬁes condition (18). Hence there is no ﬁrm who is able
to take over neighbor’s business without losing money.
4) We have shown that for any n ≥ 2, there exists a unique solution
to condition (10). Moreover, the strategy proﬁle characterized by this
condition is indeed an equilibrium because ﬁrms’ payoﬀs are strictly
quasiconcave in own strategy and there is no incentive for ﬁrms to
undercut neighbors. This concludes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof:































































Since (1 − ε∗) > 0 by Lemma 1 and dε∗
dp > 0, in equilibrium
dp∗
dn < 0.

















































































































































A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: From Lemma 3, we know that equilibrium elasticity under free
entry increases in ﬁxed cost. From Lemma 4, we know that nc >n f when
23ε∗
nc < 3
4, nc = nf when ε∗
nc = 3
4, and nc <n f when ε∗
nc > 3
4.
We have to consider two cases:
i) ε∗
n=2 ≥ 3
4. Then, there exists a ﬁxed cost ¯ f such that the resulting
equilibrium demand elasticity is equal to 3
4. Since ε∗
nc increases in
f,f o rf<¯ f, ε∗
nc < 3
4 which leads to excessive entry by Lemma 4.
Conversely, for f>¯ f, ε∗
nc > 3
4 which means insuﬃcient entry.
ii) ε∗
n=2 < 3
4. Then, since ε∗
nc decreases in n, ε∗
nc < 3
4 for all values of f.
And hence, there is excess entry.
We can also reformulate Proposition 2 in terms of transportation costs.
What we need ﬁrst is to show that there is a monotone relationship be-






dt < 0,a s dε
dn < 0 from Lemma 2 and dn
dt > 0.
Again, we must distinguish the two cases:
i) ε∗
n=2 ≥ 3
4. Then, there exists a transportation cost ¯ t such that the
resulting equilibrium demand elasticity is equal to 3
4. Since ε∗
nc de-
creases in t,f o rt>¯ t, ε∗
nc < 3
4 which leads to excessive entry by
Lemma 4. Conversely, for t<¯ t, ε∗
nc > 3




4. Then, since ε∗
nc decreases in n, ε∗
nc < 3
4 for all values of t.
And hence, there is excess entry.
We state the result formally as a corollary:
Corollary 1. Welfare result in terms of transportation costs.
i) Suppose ε∗
n=2 ≥ 3
4 and deﬁne t as the transportation cost level that
leads to equilibrium price elasticity ε∗ of 3
4. Then there is excess
entry if t>t, insuﬃcient entry if t<t and optimal entry if t = t.
ii) Suppose ε∗
n=2 < 3
4, then there is excess entry for all t>T.
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